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ARTICLES
MANDATORY GUIDELINES: THE OXYMORONIC STATE
OF SENTENCING AFTER UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
The Honorable Graham C. Mullen *
J.P. Davis *
I. INTRODUCTION
Like a vampire buried without a stake, mandatory sentencing
guidelines have been resurrected to stalk our jurisprudence once
more. When the Supreme Court announced the end of the manda-
tory Sentencing Guidelines regime in United States v. Booker,'
many expected to see a major paradigm shift in the way sen-
tences were handed down. A year and half has passed since
Booker, but little has changed. Judges are still enhancing sen-
tences based on facts neither found by a jury nor admitted by the
defendant, and nearly two-thirds of all sentences are within the
prescribed Guidelines range, a difference of less than ten percent
from pre-Booker levels.2 While the principal results of sentencing
remain the same, the logistics of sentencing have changed. Sen-
tencing has become more complicated than ever before and con-
sumes more judicial time and resources. The ultimate result is
that the constitutional issues behind Booker and its parent case
* Judge Graham C. Mullen was appointed to the federal bench in 1990. He served as
Chief Judge for the Western District of North Carolina from 1998 through 2005. Prior to
his appointment, Judge Mullen was in private practice in Gastonia, North Carolina.
** J.P. Davis is an Associate at James, McElroy & Diehl P.A. in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Prior to that position, he served as a law clerk to Hon. Graham C. Mullen.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, app. D-10 (2006).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Apprendi v. New Jersey3 have been glossed over while the federal
courts grow more backlogged in the process.
Now, as the Supreme Court stands poised to decide the issue in
Claiborne v. United States4 and Rita v. United States5 , the time
has come to examine the constitutional and practical ramifica-
tions of our post-Booker jurisprudence. In particular, this article
will focus on the Fourth Circuit, which originated Rita. First, we
will discuss the Supreme Court's decisions leading up to Booker,
especially Apprendi and Booker itself, and explore the rationale
behind declaring a mandatory sentencing-enhancement scheme,
such as that embodied by the Sentencing Guidelines, to be uncon-
stitutional.
Second, we will explore the way Booker has been interpreted
and applied by the lower courts, with the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals as our primary example. We will examine the evolution
of post-Booker sentencing in the Fourth Circuit, including the
"presumption of reasonableness" applied to the Guidelines range,
and set forth the steps a district court must follow in imposing a
sentence that will be considered "reasonable." We will then briefly
compare this standard to the methods employed by other circuits.
Third, we will explore the constitutional dimensions of the
Fourth Circuit's sentencing jurisprudence, particularly with re-
gards to the presumption of reasonableness, and compare the
current sentencing regime with the principles behind Apprendi
and the substantive opinion in Booker. We conclude that the cur-
rent sentencing regime fails purely as a matter of constitutional
principle, as it essentially recreates (with a few more grounds for
variance) the mandatory Guidelines regime.
Fourth, we will give a view from the bench of the much-
neglected practical dimensions of the post-Booker sentencing re-
gime. Here, we will discuss our experience in the courtroom and
how that has changed before and after Booker, as well as how we
see sentencing continuing to evolve should the "presumption of
reasonableness" trend persist. In this section we will also discuss
the role of Congress in the development of the post-Booker sen-
tencing law.
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No.
06-5618).
5. 177 F. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006)
(No. 06-5754).
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Finally, we will undertake a brief discussion of alternatives to
the Fourth Circuit's sentencing jurisprudence and avenues for fu-
ture thought and discussion. The focus of this article is not on
these solutions, as many other, wiser, commentators are cur-
rently offering a plethora of ideas for resolving these issues. In-
stead, it is our intent merely to call attention to a few of the most
important areas in the debate. Thus, this section will be directed
only toward providing a basis for future thought rather than a de-
tailed set of possible solutions.
Hopefully, at the conclusion of this article, it will become clear
that a sentencing regime such as the one currently installed by
the Fourth Circuit after Booker is both constitutionally and
pragmatically unsound. We must chart a new course, taking into
account the goals of Congress (including the ever-present cudgel
of more restrictive legislation), the dictates of our Constitution,
and the practical realities of a justice system with limited re-
sources. Such a course could lead to a new sentencing regime that
provides both for the protection of the public and for fairness to
the defendant.
II. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER AND ITS PREDECESSORS
A. Sixth Amendment Sentencing Through Blakely
In Booker, the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of
the Federal Sentencing Act 6-which made the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines mandatory-and declared the Guidelines to be ad-
visory.7
Prior to Booker, federal judges had no choice but to make find-
ings of fact independent from those facts found by a jury or ad-
mitted by the defendant and to use these judicially determined
facts to enhance the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum
that the judge could otherwise have imposed.'
6. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3583 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
998 (2000 & Supp. III 2000).
7. Booker, 543 U.S. at 257-65.
8. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding the Guidelines to be a
constitutional delegation of power and therefore binding on the courts). Justice Scalia's
dissent in Mistretta is also noteworthy as a remarkably accurate prediction of the future.
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In Apprendi, the legislature required the judge to make a find-
ing of fact that enhanced a defendant's sentence, but labeled
those facts as "sentencing factors" rather than elements of the
crime.9 Apprendi pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose, a crime that carried a maximum sentence of
ten years.'" At sentencing, the judge found that Apprendi had
been motivated by racial animus, a fact that, by statute, in-
creased his maximum sentence to twenty years.1' The Supreme
Court reversed, setting down the rule that would go on, virtually
unaltered, to form the basis of Booker: "Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases a penalty for a crime be-
yond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 2
This rule is the essence behind our jury requirement. Trial by
jury exists because "[t]he founders of the American Republic were
not prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State." 3 If the leg-
islature could mandate raises in individual sentences based on
facts not found by a jury, it is not hard to foresee a situation
wherein
a judge could sentence a man for committing murder even if the jury
convicted him only of illegally possessing the firearm used to commit
it-or of making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death
scene. . . . The jury could not function as circuit breaker in the
State's machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a determi-
See id. at 413-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Appendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 468-69, 471 (2000).
10. Id. at 469-70.
11. Id. at 470-71.
12. Id. at 490.
13. Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. These scenarios are not far fetched. In our experience, defendants are frequently
charged with possession of a gun by a felon when the real intent is to sentence them for
some other crime; thus, the colloquial charge of "possession of a gun while shooting some-
body." Justice Scalia's "lane change" example follows the same principles, and in our ex-
perience, would be a tactic federal prosecutors would be only too happy to employ. Justice
Breyer, in his remedial opinion, in Booker crafts a hypothetical wherein a bank robber
convicted on a single charge of possession of a firearm receives the same sentence, based
on mandatory judicial fact-finding, as another defendant convicted of bank robbery itself.
Id. at 253. While this example certainly sounds compelling, it begins with the underlying
assumption that both defendants are guilty of the same crime. This logic may work well in
the hypothetical, but in the real justice system, a defendant's guilt can only be determined
by a jury or his own admission; it is not built into the equation from the start. Thus, there
are two different defendants here: one who is guilty of bank robbery and one who is guilty
of possession of a firearm. This is precisely the scenario Justice Scalia sought to avoid in
Blakely v. Washington. See 542 U.S. 296, 306-07 (2004).
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nation that the defendant at some point did something wrong, a
mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime
the State actually seeks to punish. 15
Thus, the Apprendi rule is necessary to give any effect at all to
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury.
The Court went on to clarify what it meant by "prescribed
statutory maximum" in Ring v. Arizona, 6 a capital case where
the judge made findings of fact that made the death penalty ap-
plicable," and Blakely v. Washington,is which involved state sen-
tencing guidelines that were virtually identical to the Federal
Guidelines. 9 In Blakely, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, ex-
plained that
the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the
relevant "'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional findings [of fact]."2°
Thus, even though Washington's sentencing guidelines were
not technically statutes and all fell within the technical statutory
ranges, they functioned as "micro-statutes," imposing a new
minimum and maximum, based on the facts of the case, which
judges were legally bound to follow. Because a judge could not
impose a sentence outside of the guidelines range without making
additional findings of fact beyond those contained in the jury ver-
dict or admitted by the defendant, the top of the guidelines effec-
tively served as the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes.
When a judge did make findings of fact raising that maximum,
the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applied, rendering that
judicial fact-finding unconstitutional.
15. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-07.
16. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
17. Id. at 594-95.
18. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04.
19. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
20. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 (citations omitted).
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B. The Jekyll and Hyde of Booker
The state guidelines in Blakely functioned almost identically to
the Federal Guidelines, and therefore it was not much of a sur-
prise when the Supreme Court, which had previously specifically
declined to address the issue,21 applied Blakely's logic in Booker
to render the Guidelines unconstitutional. 2  The surprise came in
the remedy. The Booker court effectively split 4-4, with Justice
Ginsburg (who wrote the opinion in Ring) straddling the middle.
One side, led by Justice Stevens, felt that Blakely clearly ren-
dered the Guidelines unconstitutional and that the only option
was to strip the guidelines of judicial fact-finding and require
that any sentence-enhancing facts23 be found by a jury or admit-
ted.24 The other camp, led by Justice Breyer, who helped develop
the initial Sentencing Guidelines, argued that the Guidelines
were not unconstitutional at all.25 Justice Ginsburg gave her vote
to the Stevens camp on the constitutionality of the Guidelines,
but, without explanation,26 sided with Justice Breyer's camp
when it came to a solution.
2 7
Justice Breyer seized upon language in the constitutional ma-
jority opinion that stated that the Guidelines would not implicate
the Sixth Amendment if they recommended, rather than re-
quired, a certain sentence,28 and used this language to strike
down two provisions in the Federal Sentencing Act, one of which
made the Guidelines mandatory for sentencing judges, and the
other that set a de novo standard of review for sentencing.29 In
their place, the remedial opinion declared that the Guidelines
were now advisory, though sentencing judges must still "consult"
them, and that sentencing decisions should be reviewed for
whether or not the sentence "is unreasonable, having regard for
21. Id. at 305 n.9.
22. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27.
23. Except the fact of a prior conviction. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
487-88 (2000) (discussing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
24. Booker, 543 U.S. at 284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 326-27 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
26. Though there are six opinions in Booker, Justice Ginsburg did not write sepa-
rately.
27. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
28. Id. at 259.
29. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004) & 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000 &
Supp. 2004)).
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... the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence•., and...
the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as
stated by the district court."3 Unfortunately, the remedial opin-
ion gave no further definition of either "advisory" or "unreason-
able."3
III. BASTARD PROGENY: POST-BOOKER SENTENCING
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
In the wake of Booker, it is clear that the Guidelines must be
"consulted" during any sentencing procedure, but it is equally
clear that automatically imposing a Guidelines sentence as
though the Guidelines were still mandatory is unconstitutional.
Other than these two mandates, appellate courts have had to di-
vine on their own the extent to which the Guidelines apply to sen-
tencing. In response to this lack of clarity, there has been an
overwhelming trend in many circuits to give, either explicitly or
implicitly, a "presumption of reasonableness" to the Guidelines
range and to examine in great detail any sentence outside of that
range. We focus here on the jurisprudence of the Fourth Circuit,
but as discussed below, this jurisprudence is similar to that found
throughout the Circuits, with a few notable exceptions.
A. Basic Sentencing in the Fourth Circuit Post-Booker
Sentencing in the Fourth Circuit after Booker can be divided
into a three-step procedure, best set forth by Judge Wilkins in
United States v. Moreland.32 First, the sentencing judge must
properly calculate the Guidelines as they were written, including
making any findings of fact that would enhance the Guidelines
range.33 Second, the judge must determine whether a Guidelines
sentence would adequately serve the factors enumerated by Con-
gress in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 34 and if not, select a sentence that
30. Id. at 261 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994)).
31. Though the two can and should be reconciled, it should be noted that there is some
intellectual strain between the two majority opinions in Booker. This should not be unex-
pected, however, where the remedy to a problem is entrusted to those who believe there
never was a problem in the first place.
32. 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006).
33. Id. at 432.
34. For a more thorough discussion of these factors, see infra Part IV and note 79.
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does.35 Third and finally, "[t]he district court must articulate the
reasons for the sentence imposed, particularly explaining any de-
parture or variance from the guideline range. The explanation of
a variance sentence must be tied to factors set forth in § 3553(a)
and must be accompanied by findings of fact as necessary."36
As stated in the remedial opinion in Booker, sentencing deci-
sions are subject to "reasonableness" review, which consists of
two parts: procedural reasonableness and substantive reason-
ableness.37 A sentence will be considered procedurally unreason-
able if it fails to conform to the three steps listed above. Proce-
dural unreasonableness is reversible error.3" Thus, if the judge
improperly calculates the Guidelines or fails to articulate his rea-
sons for a variance, the sentence will be reversed.
This is exactly what happened in United States v. Green,39
where the sentencing judge determined that even though Green
technically qualified for an armed career criminal enhancement,
the facts of the case were such that applying the enhancement
would result in a sentence that seriously overstated Green's
criminal record and therefore would not satisfy the § 3553(a) fac-
tors.4° The appellate court reversed without considering whether
the imposed sentence would be reasonable in light of the explana-
tion given or whether the ultimate sentence would have been dif-
ferent had the Guidelines been correctly calculated and a vari-
ance applied. Instead, the circuit held that the lower court's
failure to apply the armed career criminal enhancement was by
itself sufficient grounds for reversal.41
Substantive reasonableness review, on its face, involves deter-
mining whether the sentencing court focused "on an improper fac-
tor or reject[ed] policies articulated by Congress or the Sentencing
Commission." 2 In reality, substantive reasonableness review is
considerably more complex because of two additional develop-
35. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 434.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 453-54.
41. Id. at 458 (stating that the court's opinion "focus[ed] only on the district court's
consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines and not whether a properly calculated Guide-
line sentence would be unreasonable when measured against § 3553(a) factors").
42. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434.
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ments: the presumption of reasonableness for a sentence within
the Guidelines range, and the requirement for more persuasive
reasoning for a larger variance from the Guidelines range ("ex-
tent-of-the-variance review").
B. The Presumption of Reasonableness
The presumption of reasonableness, first instituted in More-
land,43 means that a sentence within the Guidelines range will be
assumed reasonable until it is proven that such a sentence is un-
reasonable.44 While this standard is applied literally on the appel-
late level,45 the Fourth Circuit's precedents have ensured that it
effectually applies to the sentencing level as well by requiring the
sentencing court to make findings of fact that specifically tie into
the factors of § 3553(a) before the Court may leave the Guidelines
range.46 Thus, if the judge wishes to impose a sentence within the
Guidelines range, then, at the absolute most, he is required to
state that he has considered the factors in § 3553(a) with no fur-
ther elaboration.47
This is precisely what happened in Rita, currently under re-
view by the Supreme Court. 4' There, the defendant, a distin-
guished veteran and former agent for the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, was convicted of perjury in a grand jury
investigation involving kits for creating automatic weapons (he
had purchased one of these kits prior to their recall by the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms).49 At sentencing the court
elevated Rita's offense level from 14 to 20, effectively doubling his
sentence, based on a finding that he was an accessory after the
fact to illegal importing and exporting of firearms (conduct which
43. Id.
44. Id. at 433.
45. See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006). The lan-
guage in Montes-Pineda is ambiguous as to whether its statement applies solely to the ap-
pellate level or to the initial sentencing as well. However, for reasons set forth above, it is
clear that this standard effectually applies to both.
46. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432.
47. In fact, there is even strong case law supporting the idea that he does not even
need to reference § 3553(a) at all. See United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th
Cir. 2006).
48. Rita v. United States, 177 F. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-5754).
49. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 1-2, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006)
(No. 06-5754).
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was never charged in the indictment).5" Rita's attorneys argued
for a variance based on his age and infirm physical condition, in-
cluding long-standing effects from exposure to Agent Orange, as
well as his special vulnerability as a former law enforcement
agent.5' The court denied a variance, stating only that is was "un-
able to find that the sentencing guidelines range ... is an inap-
propriate guideline range . . .and under [§1 3553, certainly the
public needs to be protected."52 In an unpublished opinion, the
Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed the finding, holding that the
sentencing judge had sufficiently invoked the factors in § 3553(a)
to satisfy Booker, 3 and that the presumption of reasonableness
automatically allowed the Guidelines sentence to stand.54 To
date, a within-guidelines sentence has never been found unrea-
sonable in the Fourth Circuit 5 (and, as of this writing, only once
for substantive reasons in any other circuit). 6
Should the sentencing judge believe a sentence outside the
Guidelines is merited, on the other hand, the Court must make
findings on the record describing exactly how the facts of the par-
ticular case before him or her relate to the § 3553(a) factors, and
specifically explaining why the proposed sentence is better than a
Guidelines sentence. 7 Moreover, in doing so, the sentencing court
must keep in mind the Fourth Circuit's proclamation that the
Guidelines are considered to already incorporate the most salient
§ 3553(a) factors.5" This explanation need not address every fac-
tor robotically, but cannot give "excessive weight" to any one fac-
tor and must show that all factors were considered, as well as
meritorious arguments on both sides. 59 Thus, the sentencing
court's decision to vary from the Guidelines range will be re-
50. Id. at 2-3.
51. Id. at 3-4.
52. Id. at 5.
53. United States v. Rita, 177 F. App'x 357, 358 (4th Cir. 2006).
54. Id.
55. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 49, at 32.
56. Id. at 30-31.
57. See United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2006) (reversing
because the district court "did not explain how this variance sentence better served the
competing interests of § 3553(a) than the guidelines sentence would").
58. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2006) holding that the
process creating the Guidelines "has led to the incorporation . . .of the factors Congress
identified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) as most salient in sentencing determinations"). In light
of this reasoning, the circumstances where a variance sentence will actually be held to be
"better" than a Guidelines sentence will be scant indeed.
59. United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 2006).
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versed if the judge does not specifically relate the factors in §
3553(a) to the facts of the particular case before him, making spe-
cific factual findings showing that a Guidelines sentence does not
adequately serve the § 3553(a) factors and that a variant sen-
tence does. It is important to note that the Fourth Circuit has
never upheld a downward variance from the Guidelines.6"
C. Extent-of-the-Variance Review
Even once the high hurdle posed by the presumption of reason-
ableness has been passed and the decision to vary from the
Guidelines has been correctly made, the decision of how much to
vary is independently reviewable. Simply put, the sentencing
court will be reversed if it goes too far from the Guidelines range:
"[tihe farther the [sentencing] court diverges from the advisory
guideline range, the more compelling the reason for the diver-
gence must be."61 In Moreland, the defendant was subjected to a
career offender enhancement that increased his Guidelines range
from 78-97 months to 360 months. 62 The sentencing judge cor-
rectly determined that 360 months was the appropriate Guide-
lines range, but held that the career offender enhancement over-
stated Moreland's previous controlled substance convictions (both
of which were nonviolent and one of which involved simply deliv-
ering a marijuana joint to an inmate) and failed to take into ac-
count his "'ability and potential to become a productive member of
society.' 63 Based on this, the court held that a Guidelines sen-
tence would not adequately serve the factors in § 3553(a), and in-
stead imposed a sentence of 120 months, the statutory minimum
for his offense of conviction and still more than the 78-97 month
sentence the Guidelines suggested without the career offender
enhancement.64
60. As discussed below, however, the Fourth Circuit has ruled in at least one case that
a variance was merited, just not to the extent that the sentencing court imposed. See
United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 436 (4th Cir 2006). For a thorough breakdown of
appellate sentencing statistics, spanning all circuits, see New York Council of Defense
Lawyers, Reasonableness Review Database (2006), http://www.nycdl.org/itemcontent/book
er/NYCDL reasonableness-review.pdf.
61. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434; see also Hampton, 441 F.3d at 288 (stating that "[iln
order to withstand reasonableness scrutiny, such a dramatic variance from the advisory
guideline range must be supported by compelling justifications").
62. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434.
63. Id. at 435 (quoting U.S. v. Mooreland, 366 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D. W. Va.
2005)).
64. Id.
2007]
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's
reasoning, holding that a variance would indeed be reasonable
under the circumstances .65 The court then reviewed the facts that
provided the grounds for the variance one at a time. As it did so,
it explicitly noted that the sentencing court did not base the vari-
ance on a rejection of congressional policy.66 Ultimately, however,
the appellate court found that the circumstances of the case were
not "so compelling as to warrant a two-thirds reduction from the
bottom of the advisory guideline range."67 It based this decision in
part on its own reevaluation of Moreland's work history, stating
that it had "little confidence in his willingness to become a pro-
ductive member of society," effectively replacing the judgment of
the district court on this issue with its own.68 It then vacated the
sentence and remanded for re-sentencing to a smaller variance of
no less than 240 months.69 No rationale whatsoever was provided
for the choice of this number. The Moreland court did not con-
sider whether a sentence of 120 months, absent the 360 month
Guidelines range, would have satisfied the factors in § 3553(a). In
light of Moreland, it is abundantly clear that any variance im-
posed in the Fourth Circuit is judged by the degree that it varies
from the Guidelines range, not by how well it serves the § 3553(a)
factors.
D. Sentencing in Other Circuits
The Fourth Circuit is hardly alone in its post-Booker interpre-
tations. To date, six other circuits have embraced the presump-
tion of reasonableness,7 ° and two more have tacitly enforced the
same." In fact, only the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have ac-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id at 437.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v.
Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708
(6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717
(8th Cir. 2005).
71. United States v. Jimdnez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that
"the guidelines cannot be called just 'another factor'" in the statutory list); United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that "appellants have the burden of
demonstrating unreasonableness. A sentence that falls within the guidelines range is
more likely to be reasonable than one outside the guidelines range"). While these courts
[Vol. 41:625
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tively rejected the presumption of reasonableness, holding in-
stead that every sentence, within-Guidelines or otherwise, must
be reviewed for reasonableness against the § 3553(a) factors. 72
Likewise, cases in at least four circuits have reversed sentences
for properly finding that a variance was warranted but varying
too far from the Guidelines range. 7' Few of these have offered any
guidance as to where the proper sentence would be and, as in
Moreland, those that have produced actual numbers have pro-
vided no reasoning justifying the numbers they produced.
Though there are slight variations on the theme, the jurispru-
dence of the Fourth Circuit is as good a model as any for the ma-
jor trends emerging in the wake of Booker, especially in light of
the Court's grant of certiorari in a Fourth Circuit case, Rita.74 In
reviewing Rita and its sister case Claiborne," it is of utmost im-
portance that the Supreme Court ensure that appellate courts
rely on sound constitutional law and take into account the practi-
cal ramifications of its rulings. Currently, they do neither.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND POST-BOOKER SENTENCING
The watchword in sentencing is discretion. A sentencing judge,
by necessity, becomes intimately familiar with the facts of each
case in a way that no other impartial decisionmaker can. Each
crime and each criminal is unique, with a unique background,
unique circumstances, unique factors in the commission of the
crime, and a unique propensity (or lack thereof) for rehabilitation.
No blanket guideline or rule can possibly take account for all the
facts of an individual case; only a sentencing judge, who receives
those facts first-hand, can approximate a sense of the entire
still give heavy weight to the Guidelines, their position is indisputably more deferential
than the presumption of reasonableness adopted by the Fourth Circuit and others.
72. See United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1185 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
"[w]hether, after consideration of § 3553(a) in its entirety, a court finds the Guidelines to
be compelling is a fact-specific judgment that we neither mandate nor foreclose").
73. United States v. Robinson, 454 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2005).
74. 177 F. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (Nov. 3, 2006) (No.
06-5754).
75. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), cert granted 127 S. Ct. 551 (Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-
5618).
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situation.76 Of course, this discretion can be constrained by Con-
gress, but when a judge's discretion is so constrained, the Sixth
Amendment provides a careful limitation: no rule or guideline
may raise a defendant's sentence beyond the maximum author-
ized through jury verdict or by the defendant's admission. This
safeguard prevents a defendant from receiving a heightened sen-
tence based not on the factual entirety of his case, but on "micro-
crimes" for which he has not been proven guilty.
At least, such is the logical implication of Apprendi and Booker.
According to Apprendi, the statutory maximum for Sixth
Amendment purposes is the maximum sentence a defendant may
receive without the finding of any facts other than those admitted
by the defendant or contained in a jury verdict." After Booker,
there are three constitutionally-acceptable ways that a defen-
dant's sentence may be increased based on the facts of the case.
First, a judge may constitutionally consider any and all circum-
stances in formulating a sentence within the bounds of the statu-
tory range.78 This discretion is unreviewable, except for clear er-
ror of fact or misapplication of the § 3553(a) factors, such as
consideration of a statutorily forbidden factor.79 Second, Congress
may set a mandatory increase of the maximum sentence based on
any facts it chooses, but those facts must be found by a jury or
admitted by the defendant.8 " Third and finally, the fact of a prior
conviction may always be used to increase a maximum sentence
without a jury verdict or admission.8 '
76. See Eric Citron, Sentencing Review: Judgment, Justice, and the Judiciary, 115
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 150, 151 (2006), available at httpJ/www.thepocketpart.org/
2006/07/citron.html.
77. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
78. Id. at 481.
79. Id. at 481-82 (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)). Congress
may, of course, prescribe what a judge can and cannot consider in determining a sentence.
For example, Congress may say, "in sentencing, the court must consider the impact on the
victim, and cannot consider the defendant's childhood." In such a situation, a judge's fail-
ure to take into account the impact on the victim or inclusion of the defendant's childhood
in his sentencing determination would be reversible error. However, if he took into ac-
count the former and did not take into account the latter, whatever sentence he imposed,
so long as it was within the statutory range and did not involve clear error of fact, would
be unreviewable.
80. Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
81. Id. at 498 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27
(1998)). Though this is the current law, the Court intimated in Apprendi that this scenario
could be constitutionally dubious. Id. at 489-90.
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The Fourth Circuit has in no way abandoned pre-Booker sen-
tencing procedure. In fact, pre-Booker and post-Booker sentencing
are identical, right up to the determination of a Guidelines range.
Judges still use facts not found by the jury to enhance the defen-
dant's Guidelines range, using exactly the same standard of proof
and the exact same methodology as before. Whatever changes
were made to comply with Booker must occur after the Guidelines
range has been determined-in the variance phase.
Once the court reaches the variance phase, the presumption of
reasonableness requires the court to set forth specific facts that
show why any variant sentence is superior to a Guidelines sen-
tence.82 Without this, the court will be reversed. If the facts are
deemed insufficient by the appellate court, the sentencing court
will also be reversed. The sentencing judge cannot simply discuss
why the proposed sentence would serve the § 3553(a) factors;'
the court must actively show why a Guidelines sentence would
not serve the § 3553(a) factors as well as would a variant sen-
tence.' This stands in stark contrast to a within-Guidelines sen-
tence, which apparently barely even requires a cursory indication
that the judge considered the § 3553(a) factors in order to be up-
held.85
The Fourth Circuit would likely dispute this interpretation,
noting that both Moreland and Hampton proclaim that the pre-
sumptive reasonableness of a guidelines sentence "does not mean
. . . that a variance sentence is presumptively unreasonable."86
But this statement is demonstrably false. As the circuit court
noted in Montes-Pineda, the burden is on the defendant to rebut
82. See United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2006).
83. It is important to note here that § 3553(a)'s prime dictate is that the judge impose
a sentence "sufficient but not greater than necessary" to comply with its purposes. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Thus, based solely on the facts of conviction, a
judge might well reasonably determine that the Guidelines did not provide the lowest suf-
ficient sentence necessary to serve the § 3553(a) factors, even though a Guidelines sentence
would otherwise achieve those goals.
84. See Hampton, 441 F.3d at 288 ("[W]e must more carefully scrutinize the reasoning
offered by the district court in support of the sentence. The farther the court diverges from
the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must
be.") (quoting United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006))). Judge Motz,
writing for the majority in Hampton, then dissected the district court's reasoning, and de-
termined that even though the district court did invoke relevant factors under § 3553(a) in
making its decision, it did not explain how the sentence imposed served those factors bet-
ter than the Guideline sentence. Id. at 288-89.
85. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2006).
86. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 433 (emphasis added).
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the presumption of reasonableness, and this burden requires
facts demonstrating that a Guidelines sentence would be unrea-
sonable. 7 Though Montes-Pineda could have been referring
purely to appellate burdens of proof (the text is unclear), the ef-
fect is still exactly the same from the sentencing court's stand-
point: without affirmative factual evidence that a Guidelines sen-
tence would be unreasonable and a detailed list of reasons
supporting that determination, the sentencing court cannot im-
pose a sentence outside the Guidelines range. A sentence outside
the Guidelines range requires a judge to justify its existence by
citing compelling individual facts under a rigorous standard of
review. If the judge fails to cite facts deemed adequate by the Cir-
cuit, the sentence will be reversed. 8 If this does not qualify as a
presumption against an outside-of-Guidelines sentence, it is un-
clear what such a presumption would look like.
To break this argument down into a more manageable form, let
us put it in terms of the question posed by Apprendi: is the
maximum sentence that a judge may impose after judicial fact-
finding higher than the maximum sentence the judge may impose
based on the jury verdict or admissions alone? Here, the answer
is yes. Therefore, the presumption of reasonableness sentencing
scheme is unconstitutional.
Essentially, what the presumption of reasonableness has insti-
tuted is a mandatory Guidelines system with greater ground for
departure, in the form of a variance, than before. As the Stevens
majority stated in Booker:
The availability of a departure in specified circumstances does not
avoid the constitutional issue ... [because] departures are not avail-
able in every case, and in fact are unavailable in most. In most cases,
as a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all
relevant factors into account, and no departure will be legally per-
missible. In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a sentence
within the Guidelines range. 89
This remains true, as the Fourth Circuit has explicitly said that
the Guidelines incorporate the most salient § 3553(a) factors. 90
87. United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 634 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that
since there was nothing atypical in Eura's case, no variance would be allowed).
89. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005).
90. Johnson, 445 F.3d at 342-43.
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Justice Stevens went on to apply this reasoning to Booker's case:
Booker's is a run-of-the-mill drug case, and does not present any fac-
tors that were inadequately considered by the Commission. The sen-
tencing judge would therefore have been reversed had he not im-
posed a sentence within the ... Guidelines range. Booker's actual
sentence, however, was ... almost 10 years longer than the Guide-
lines range supported by the jury verdict alone .... Thus, just as in
Blakely, "the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.
The judge acquires the authority only upon finding some additional
fact." There is no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed
pursuant to Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentences im-
posed [here]. 91
To illustrate, let us imagine that Freddy Booker is being re-
sentenced in the Fourth Circuit today. Again, the jury has con-
victed him of possession of at least 50 grams of crack based on
evidence of 92.5 grams of crack, again rendering a Guidelines of-
fense level of 32 and a sentence of 210-262 months. If there were
no other facts and this was where our inquiry ended, Booker
could not receive a sentence greater than 262 months. However,
as he was prior to Supreme Court's decision, Booker's sentencing
judge is required to properly calculate the Guidelines, which, as
before, results in a factual finding of 566 additional grams of
crack not presented to the jury, enhancing the Guideline range to
360 months. Booker's case still has no unusual facts; it is "run-of-
the-mill." If the judge now imposes a sentence outside of the
Guidelines range, such as the verdict-authorized maximum of 262
months, then, regardless of § 3553(a) purposes (remember, he has
no specific facts from this defendant to tie into his arguments), he
will be reversed.
This example makes it clear that based on the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of Booker, absolutely nothing has changed. In the
average, run-of-the-mill case, the Sentencing Guidelines are just
as mandatory as ever. A judge must still use facts not found by a
jury to enhance a sentence beyond what he would be able to im-
pose based on the jury verdict alone, and he has no discretion to
go outside of the enhanced range, except with a further finding of
fact. This system is exactly as it was prior to Booker, only now,
the field of potential facts that might authorize a sentence outside
the Guidelines range is slightly expanded. The availability of
91. Booker, 543 U.S. at 235 (citations omitted).
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downward departures did nothing to rescue Washington's sen-
tencing guidelines in Blakely and did nothing to rescue the Fed-
eral Guidelines in Booker. There is no reason why expanding the
availability of these fact-based departures and terming them
"variances" should do anything to save the sentencing scheme in
place today.
Further, even in situations where a variance is actually
granted, Fourth Circuit jurisprudence runs into a field of consti-
tutional snares. Because the extent of a variance will also be in-
dependently measured for reasonableness,92 the further one
strays from the Guidelines, the greater the justification that must
be presented. Thus, even variance sentences result in an uncon-
stitutional increase in the defendant's sentence.
As discussed previously, a judge is required to make findings of
fact to raise the Guidelines range.93 Then, the judge must decide
whether a variance is warranted.94 If so, the judge must decide
the degree of the variance and present a justification relative to
the distance of the sentence from the Guidelines range.95 Cur-
rently, neither the Fourth Circuit nor its contemporaries have
provided any form of guidance as to how to make this calculation.
From the language of Moreland, it is clear that the Guidelines
range, not the specific facts and factors applied to the case, de-
termines the degree of scrutiny a sentence will receive, and con-
sequently, the range of permissible variance. Thus, in Moreland
itself, the district court's sentence of 120 months was much longer
than the Guidelines range of 78-97 months Moreland would have
been subject to absent the career-offender enhancement.96 As the
appellate court upheld the district court's reasoning that the ca-
reer-offender enhancement overstated Moreland's criminal his-
tory, the appellate court, had it reviewed that sentence purely
based on § 3553(a) factors alone, might well have found that the
120-month enhanced sentence adequately served to punish the
crime of conviction while taking into account the defendant's re-
cord. In fact, the appellate court did not find that a sentence of
120 months was too short to adequately serve the § 3553(a) fac-
92. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006).
93. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.B.
94. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.
95. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.C.
96. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434-35.
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tors. Instead, it found that the facts of Moreland's case were in-
sufficient to justify a sentence two-thirds lower than the Guide-
lines range.9 7 Had the career-offender enhancement merely
placed Moreland's Guidelines range at 200 months, it is distinctly
possible that a 120-month sentence would have been found rea-
sonable. Thus, the Guidelines, not the § 3553(a) factors, provide
the basis for the length of the sentence that may be imposed.
Therefore, as the Guidelines are enhanced based on facts not
found by a jury or admitted by a defendant, the maximum extent
of any variance is also enhanced. Once more, the defendant's sen-
tence is being increased past the Apprendi statutory maximum
based solely on facts not found by a jury or admitted by the de-
fendant. This determination is just as unconstitutional now as it
was before Booker.
The Stevens majority in Booker stated that the Sentencing
Guidelines would not implicate the Sixth Amendment if they
"could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended,
rather than required, the selection of particular sentences.""8 The
question we must now ask ourselves is whether or not the Guide-
lines as employed in sentencing today can possibly be considered
"recommended, rather than required."99 Since a judge cannot
leave the enhanced Guidelines range without making further
specific findings of fact beyond those authorized by the jury ver-
dict or admitted by the defendant, it is difficult to see how they
could be considered merely recommendations. In Ring, the Court
stated that when the government "makes an increase in a defen-
dant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact,
that fact-no matter how the [government] labels it-must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.""' The Fourth Circuit
has chosen to label the mandatory nature of the Guidelines as a
simple, surreptitious "presumption of reasonableness,"101 but the
evidence indicates that the Guidelines are mandatory, and pun-
97. Id. at 437. A very similar calculation attracted the Supreme Court's attention in
Claiborne, where the 8th Circuit characterized as "extraordinary" a 63% reduction in a
defendant's sentence. 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006). For a thorough discussion of the
absurdity of a percentage-based definition of "extraordinary variance" see Brief of Peti-
tioner, Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006) (No. 06-5618).
98. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
99. Id.
100. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000)).
101. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 433.
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ishments are still being increased based solely on facts neither
found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant. If Booker is to
have any meaning at all, these sentence-enhancing factors must
be either sent to a jury or consigned to the judge's discretion.
There is simply no other way to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.
V. SENTENCING UNDER THE FOURTH CIRCUIT PARADIGM:
A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE COURTROOM
A. The Sentencing Process-An Overview
From the perspective of an ideological purist, sentencing
should involve as much detail, time, and attention as the district
court can spare. Unfortunately, these demands can place crip-
pling burdens on district courts, an effect that can be hard to
foresee from the distance of an appellate courtroom. While judi-
cial economy should never be invoked as an excuse to sacrifice the
effective operation of the criminal law (both in terms of protection
of the public and fairness to the defendant), an appellate court
should be hesitant to impose any requirements that needlessly
complicate the sentencing process. This is especially true when
these complicating rules not only fail to serve an important con-
gressional or constitutional goal, but actively work to defeat those
goals. Yet, this failure is precisely what has happened in the
wake of Booker.
In our experience, sentencing has become needlessly complex
following Booker, greatly increasing the amount of time a judge
must spend in preparation and in the courtroom and, conse-
quently, decreasing the amount of time and attention that can be
paid to the rest of his or her already crowded docket. A brief over-
view of the current sentencing process as it plays out in real life
using Judge Mullen's sixteen years of experience on the federal
bench in the Western District of North Carolina should provide a
useful backdrop for this discussion.
Essentially, sentencing post-Booker can be broken down into
three main phases: preparation, Guidelines calculation, and con-
sideration of a variance. Preparation involves the creation of a
Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR") by the Probation Office, which seeks
to determine all relevant conduct and arrive at a proposed Guide-
lines range for the judge, objections to that PSR by the parties,
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and written briefs arguing the objections or for a departure or
variance. All of this must be considered by the sentencing judge
prior to the hearing, and he must also familiarize himself more
generally with the case before him in order to understand all the
facts that will play into the sentencing decision. In our experi-
ence, sentencing prior to the presumption of reasonableness re-
quired approximately a half-day, or five to six hours, of the
judge's personal attention for a routine sentencing hearing (about
ten to twelve defendants). In the wake of the Fourth Circuit's
post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence, the same amount of prepa-
ration is needed for six or seven defendants, essentially doubling
the overall preparation time the judge must devote to his cases.
Once the hearing begins, the court must proceed exactly as it
did prior to Booker, including any departures and the determina-
tion of the accurate Guidelines range.102 The length of this portion
may vary and defendants rarely object to many facts in the PSR.
If they do object, however, the Government must prove those
facts by a preponderance of the evidence, which results in a
"mini-trial" with both sides presenting evidence, including wit-
nesses, exhibits, and arguments. Should either side wish to seek
a departure as authorized by the Guidelines, even more argument
ensues. The seeking of traditional departures has dropped in fre-
quency after Booker, but recent statistics reveal that this trend is
reversing. 103 Again, all of this occurred prior to Booker, and con-
tinues unchanged today.
At this point, however, the Court must engage in yet another
inquiry, determining whether or not the Guidelines adequately
serve the purposes of sentencing as listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).1" 4 As the judge is required by Moreland to make specific
102. The one exception, as noted above, is the increase in preparation time required,
resulting in what is effectively a doubling of the time spent to prepare per case.
103. See SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, CASES
SENTENCED SUBSEQUENT TO U.S. v. BOOKER (Jul. 6, 2006), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/sc.cases/PostBooker_060106.pdf.
104. The following factors must be considered in sentencing:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most ef-
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findings of fact when granting a variance, 115 the party seeking a
variance from the Guidelines range must introduce factual evi-
dence to support their position, and the other side may, of course,
rebut this evidence, resulting in yet another "mini-trial."
The Fourth Circuit and its sister circuits have been willing to
allow variances in a remarkably limited set of circumstances and
given the fact that the court must consider every factor, it is in
the defendant's best interests to produce as much evidence as
possible concerning every single factor. This phase can be enor-
mous, involving, for example:
fective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guide-
lines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant
to § 994(a)(1) of title 28 United States Code, subject
to any amendments made to such guidelines by act
of Congress (regardless of whether such amend-
ments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing
Commission into amendments issued under § 994(p)
of title 20); and
(ii) that, except as provided in § 3742(g), are in effect
on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation of supervised re-
lease, the applicable guidelines or policy statements is-
sued bu the Sentencing Commission pursuant to §
994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into ac-
count any amendments made to such guidelines or policy
statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentenc-
ing Commission into amendments issued under § 994(p)
of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement-
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to §
994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any
amendments made to such policy statement by act of
Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have
yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
amendments issued under § 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in § 3742(g), is in effect on the
date the defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
105. See Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434.
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1. Testimony of the defendant and others concerning the exact
circumstances of the crime, including rebuttal witnesses;
0 6
2. Testimony of the defendant and others concerning the charac-
ter and circumstances of the defendant, including: his family obli-
gations, his support network (or lack thereof), his employment his-
tory and ability to retain a job, his motivations for the crime and
regret or lack thereof, his post-arrest behavior, his health, his men-
tal well-being, or any other facts related to his characteristics that
might mitigate his sentence; 
0 7
3. Evidence about the deterrent effect of the proposed sentence
as it relates to this particular defendant and crime;108 and
4. Evidence of the sentences given to other defendants similarly
situated, which is often extensive and complex.'o9
Given the vast array of potential evidence in the variance phase,
these hearings can be extensive, sometimes lasting as long as two
or more hours for a single defendant.
B. Results of the Sentencing Process
In our experience, the average time that must be spent on each
case has essentially doubled and even now, attorneys are not
comfortable with post-Booker sentencing and do not pursue vari-
ances as much as they could. As more defense attorneys grow fa-
miliar with post-Booker jurisprudence, we expect to see an even
greater increase in time consumed per sentencing. Thus, on a day
when the court would have previously heard ten to twelve cases,
perhaps only five or six will be effectively dealt with, though
those five or six require the same amount of preparation as the
twelve. Judges with higher docket loads now spend much of their
time in the courtroom. As the time it takes to conduct a sentenc-
ing increases, and as the seventy-day rule"0 still requires that at-
tention be given to new criminal cases, civil cases languish unat-
tended. It is our prediction that removal and refusal to
magistrate jurisdiction will increasingly be used as cudgels in
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000).
107. See id.
108. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
109. See id. § 3553(a)(6).
110. See id. § 3161(c)(1).
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business litigation, because a case simply will not be able to pro-
ceed on track once assigned to a federal judge. While the only way
to truly deal with this problem is an increase in the size of the ju-
diciary, a more stream-lined sentencing procedure would greatly
alleviate the difficulties here.
Let there be no mistake, sentencing after Booker must inevita-
bly increase the amount of time spent per sentence so long as the
Guidelines remain in effect, either in the current, effectively man-
datory, system or in a truly advisory capacity. This is simply un-
avoidable and should not be disparaged idly.'' However, that in-
crease can and should be minimized by abolishing the
unconstitutional presumption of reasonableness attached to a
Guidelines sentence. The incredibly high standard for imposition
of a variance ensures that defendants leave no stone unturned in
pouring evidence onto the court, and the court must spend a great
deal of time scrutinizing this evidence to determine whether a
variance is required. Essentially, if T's are not crossed and I's are
not dotted, a judge can be sure he will be reversed, and this prob-
ability is only enhanced by the degree to which appellate courts
scrutinize the extent of a variance. A lengthy and thorough justifi-
cation requires a lengthy and thorough hearing, and thus a
lengthy and thorough examination of the evidence in that hear-
ing. With more discretion comes greater flexibility, allowing the
judge to tailor his sentencing proceedings to the most effective
balance between judicial economy and the need to properly con-
sider all grounds for variance.
C. Appellate Court Ping-Pong
On the appellate level, two rules imposed with no regard for
judicial economy push the expenditure of judicial resources into
the realm of absurdity. First, as noted above, the procedural rea-
sonableness requirement causes any sentence that fails to ade-
quately calculate the Guidelines range or is imposed as a vari-
ance without a detailed statement of reasons to be automatically
reversed."' While this requirement increases the amount of at-
111. As Lord Blackstone noted, "[Liet it be again remembered, that delays, and little
inconveniences in the form of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 350 (R.I. Burn ed., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1783).
112. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006).
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tention a judge must pay to the original sentencing hearing, and
consequently, the amount of time and resources spent on the sen-
tencing as a whole, this expenditure alone is probably not egre-
gious in and of itself, as most judges will take care to follow pro-
cedural rules with or without the threat of automatic reversal. At
the appellate level, however, a reasonable sentence will be auto-
matically reversed without a determination as to the merits of the
appeal.
Second, the appellate courts doggedly insist that different lev-
els of proof are required for different levels of variance, yet they
rarely adequately explain their reasoning in cases where this
principle has been applied. Even in the few cases where the ap-
pellate court has instituted an actual figure to guide the judge on
re-sentencing, they have given no explanation for how this figure
was derived and certainly have not said anything that might help
a sentencing judge in future cases.
When these two rules are combined, a result occurs that might
best be called "appellate court ping-pong." Sentences automati-
cally reversed for procedural unreasonableness will almost inevi-
tably lead to a new appeal, as the merits have never been
reached. This begins the process all over again. On top of this,
"extent of the variance" review has a similar effect, as judges re-
sentence based on the loose reasoning given to them by the appel-
late court without any guidance whatsoever. Again, this inevita-
bly results in a new appeal and, potentially, a new reversal.
This loop is precisely what happened in United States v. Mar-
tin,"3 where the sentencing judge was reversed for imposing too
great a variance, imposed a new variance, and was reversed
again." 4 In order to prevent this, the appellate courts occasion-
ally state what the maximum allowable variance would be, which,
in essence, completely usurps the function of the lower court, re-
quiring the appellate court to expend even more energy in the
process. Thus, until judicial guidelines exist for what factual
situations justify what degree of deviation (the institution of
which would invoke serious constitutional difficulties, similar to
those addressed above), courts will constantly be subject to the
113. 455 F.3d 1227 (iith Cir. 2006).
114. See id. at 1230. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit still refused to pass on what a
reasonable sentence might be, but ordered the case reassigned to a different judge for re-
sentencing. Id. at 1241-42.
20071
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
second-guessing of the circuit, appeals will be frequent, and re-
versals and re-sentencings will be abundant.
The expenditure of increasingly scarce judicial resources in-
voked by the current system simply cannot be overstated. The
system is clogged with cases, forcing civil litigants to wait years
for the first level of justice, or else enter unfavorable settlements
if they wish to avoid being caught in the congestion. This delay
might be acceptable were some legitimate purpose served by the
presumption of reasonableness, the automatic nature of proce-
dural reasonableness review reversal, and extent-of-the-variance
review, but none is. As described above, two of these three are, in
fact, unconstitutional, and cannot possibly justify the expenditure
of any judicial resources.115 As for automatic reversal based on
procedural reasonableness review, it is hard to fathom what pur-
pose this could serve, as without this, a sentence would still be
reversed if it were held to fail the objectives set out by Congress.
The amount of time judges spend on sentencing is enormous, and
it is only increasing. Unless something is done to alleviate this
problem, the system will grind to a stand still.
C. The Role of Congress in the Current Sentencing Debate
A discussion of the practical aspects of post-Booker sentencing
would be remiss without mention of the proverbial elephant in
the room: the all-too-real threat that Congress will remove even
more discretion from the judiciary. For years, Congress, particu-
larly Representative James F. Sensenbrenner, former head of the
House Judicial Committee, has threatened further legislation to
induce compliance from the judiciary. Never has this been more
true than in the aftermath of Booker. Recently, Representative
Sensenbrenner introduced legislation designed to institute a top-
less guidelines system, wherein the constitutional problem of
Booker would be addressed by giving judges unfettered discretion
to impose the maximum sentence allowed by statute, but requir-
ing judges to find facts raising the mandatory minimum to which
a defendant would be subject.'16
115. See supra Part IV.
116. See Sentencing Fairness and Equity Restoration Act of 2006, H.R. 6254, 109th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
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Appellate courts, ever sensitive to political winds, have been
careful in crafting a post-Booker system that will comply with
what they believe Congress wishes, knowing full well that any
legislation would only reduce judicial discretion and result in
harsher sentences and fewer rights for defendants. However real-
istic these fears may be, and however much we may vehemently
disagree with the policies driving this hypothetical future legisla-
tion, the judiciary cannot abrogate its role to faithfully interpret
the Constitution simply because we believe Congress will make
disastrous policy decisions in the future. It is not the role of the
courts to make policy. As private citizens and judges, we can, and
should, attempt to educate both our legislature and the populace
at large as to why the type of reform championed by Representa-
tive Sensenbrenner is both cruel and foolish, and we should do
our best, as any citizen should, to influence our representatives in
Congress toward making the correct decisions. But what we can-
not do is substitute our professional judgments for theirs by ig-
noring our responsibility to uphold the Constitution. Neither can
we attempt to divine what the legislature might do in the future,
and tailor our jurisprudence around what we believe Congress
might want. It is Congress's job to create legislation expressing
its will, and the job of the federal courts to interpret that legisla-
tion and square it with the principles of the Constitution. Though
the results may be catastrophic, those results must be dealt with
by Congress. The results of a judiciary that refuses to apply the
Constitution because it is fearful of Congressional activity are far
worse.
That said, Congress should not rush to apply a "fix" to Booker.
There has been very little experimentation in the courts, in large
part due to the threat of Congressional action. If Congress were to
allow the courts more breathing room, it would see a great deal
more post-Booker experimentation, likely resulting in a better
understanding of what does and does not work in federal sentenc-
ing. We must push Congress towards this understanding, and we
must not abdicate the constitutional role of the courts for fear
that they will not "get it."
VI. TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM
The remedial opinion in Booker left many terms undefined,
creating a wave of confusion resulting in the constitutional and
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practical dilemmas outlined above. Ultimately, given the varia-
tion across circuits and the growing constitutional issues arising
in the post-Booker jurisprudence, Supreme Court intervention
was inevitable. Only the Supreme Court has the power to clarify
the confusion it left behind in the wake of Booker and to truly en-
force Apprendi principles. Now, in Claiborne and Rita, the Court
will directly examine whether a presumption of reasonableness
should ever be afforded to the Sentencing Guidelines, extent-of-
the-variance review, and whether a within-guidelines sentence
can ever be upheld without explicitly examining the § 3553(a) fac-
tors.
We leave it to other, wiser scholars to truly flesh out the many
potential paths sentencing may take after Booker, and fervently
hope that the Supreme Court will take careful note of these thor-
ough examinations in deciding Claiborne and Rita. In brief, how-
ever, it appears to us that any true solution to the problems that
have arisen post-Booker must follow one of two paths to comply
with the Sixth Amendment, correlating with the constitutionally
acceptable requirements set out in Part IV: (1) the discretionary
path or (2) the jury finding path. The fault-line issue between the
two lies in whether or not "a correct Guidelines calculation" will
include facts not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
A. The Discretionary Path
The discretionary path allows the Guidelines to continue being
calculated as they are today but grants the sentencing judge
much greater discretion as to whether or not to follow the Guide-
lines' "advice." Essentially, the Guidelines serve as an anchor,'17
a starting point from which the judge may base his evaluation of
the individual case. The judge may then choose whether or not to
vary from the Guidelines as he sees fit under the circumstances of
the individual case, and review of this decision would be sharply
curtailed.
117. See Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 140 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/gert
ner.html (describing the process of anchoring and the role advisory Guidelines play in this
process). Judge Gertner notes that judgments tend to be strongly biased towards their an-
chors, a fact which strongly supports the belief that this system would still adequately
serve the Congressional objectives involved in creating the sentencing commission and the
Guidelines in the first place. See id. at 138.
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This is not to say that even the most liberal version of the dis-
cretionary path gives the sentencing judge unfettered discretion,
however. The procedural aspect of reasonableness review would
survive intact. The judge would be required to calculate the
Guidelines properly, make findings of fact that enhance the
Guidelines range, consider the § 3553(a) factors and tailor a sen-
tence that conforms with the purposes of sentencing set out in
those factors, and state on the record his reasons for imposing the
sentence that he does. Failure to do any of these could well be
considered reversible error.118 Essentially, from the constitutional
angle, procedural reasonableness review would be unchanged.
Substantive reasonableness review, on the other hand, would
change dramatically. Under a discretionary path approach, sub-
stantive reasonableness review would be limited to exactly what
Moreland claimed it would be: a determination as to whether the
judge properly considered the factors in § 3553(a), congressional
policy and made no clear errors of fact." 9 A sentence would be
held unreasonable if the judge considered a factor not listed in §
3553(a) or failed to consider one of the listed factors. Further,
misconstruction of a factor, such as considering the disparity be-
tween state and federal defendants, 2 ° would also be grounds for
reversal. In sum, the judge must consider § 3553(a) factors as
Congress intended them to be considered. This approach does not
require an appellate court to attempt to divine what Congress
would do if Congress were the judge on this case. It simply means
that a judge who misinterprets or misapplies a factor is subject to
reversal. As in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits today, no pre-
sumption of reasonableness would apply, and all sentences,
Guidelines or not, would be reviewed in light of the purposes set
forth in § 3553(a).
An example is in order. Imagine a case where the defendant is
a fifty-five-year-old man with health problems convicted of pos-
session of over five grams of crack, which carries a statutory sen-
118. But see supra Part V.B (discussing why making a Guidelines miscalculation auto-
matic grounds for reversal is unwise from a practical standpoint).
119. Some might find even this level of review constitutionally offensive. See David J.
D'Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The Impact of Appellate Review on Defendant's Rights,
24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 173, 192-94 (2006) (discussing why any substantive reasonable-
ness inquiry must fail the dictates of the Sixth Amendment).
120. United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 685 (4th Cir. 2006).
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tence of five to forty years.12' The defendant has two prior con-
trolled substance offenses, qualifying him for a career offender
enhancement, placing his offense level at 34 and his criminal his-
tory category at VI, subjecting him to a sentence of 262-327
months in prison. 122 At sentencing, the judge finds that the
Guidelines fail to take health problems into account, and there-
fore an earlier release is warranted. The judge then imposes a
sentence at the statutory minimum of sixty months, a seventy-
seven percent reduction in sentence.
Under the current sentencing scheme in the Fourth Circuit, the
appellate court could (and likely would) reverse for substantive
unreasonableness if the judge failed to make specific findings of
fact showing how this sixty-month sentence served all the factors
better than a Guidelines sentence for this particular defendant or
that the judge gave "excessive weight" to a single factor. 123 Or it
might, as it did in Moreland, proclaim that the defendant's physi-
cal condition warranted a reduction but that a reduction of sev-
enty-seven percent below the Guidelines required more compel-
ling reasons."'
Under a discretionary sentencing scheme, the appellate court
could only reverse this sentence if it found a misapplication of the
§ 3553(a) factors or a clear error of fact. Thus, this sentence would
be affirmed as reasonable unless, for instance, the appellate court
found that Congress specifically intended the defendant's medical
condition to be relevant only to the conditions of his sentence, not
the length, or that the district court had actually based his sen-
tence, in part, on his personal belief that career offender en-
hancements are universally too harsh. 2 Likewise, if the file
showed that the defendant had gone through many tests showing
that he was actually in excellent health, a reversal would be in
121. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2000).
122. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2005).
123. United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006). In our example, as
in Hampton, the court stated that it had considered all the factors in § 3553(a), but the
appellate court still disagreed with its reliance on a single factor. Since there must surely
be circumstances where a single factor would be sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
others, it seems that the "excessive weight" prohibition, at least until it is further defined,
may simply be code for the institution of de novo review of sentences.
124. See United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 437 (4th Cir. 2006).
125. See Citron, supra note 76, at 153.
[Vol. 41:625
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
order. Absent one of these scenarios, however, the district court's
ruling would be affirmed. 
126
The discretionary path is open to much variation. Naturally,
Congress can define what factors can and cannot be considered by
judges and may even go into great detail as to the weight as-
signed to each factor. A common law of sentencing may also
emerge from this process, as courts determine exactly how each
factor should be construed. 127 Even more radical approaches could
be pursued constitutionally, should the legislature so choose, in-
cluding the diabolical topless guidelines system championed by
the Department of Justice, 2 ' which affords judges limitless dis-
cretion to vary upwards, but requires them to make findings of
fact that raise the mandatory minimum. 129 However unwise and
inhumane we might consider such a course of action, it would
likely be constitutional. 130
B. The Jury Finding Path
If the legislature does not wish to grant sentencing judges the
discretion to determine punishment, its only other recourse is to
require jury findings or admission of any facts that will be used to
enhance a defendant's sentence. 131 The most obvious example of
126. Id. (stating that a consistent pattern from a judge showing that his reasoning is
nothing more than pretense might also be grounds for a remand).
127. See generally Amy Baron-Evans, Antidote to the Kool-Aid: Giving the Guidelines
Substantial or Presumptive Weight is Constitutionally, Textually and Factually Unsound
(2006), http://www.fd.org/pdf lib/antidote%20for%20the%20kool%20aid.pdf.
128. See Judiciary Asks Congress to Tread Carefully with Sentencing, THE THIRD
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2006, http://www.
uscourts.gov/ttb/04-06/tread-carefully/index.html (recounting testimony of members of the
judiciary before the Senate Judiciary Committee discussing potential legislative action,
including topless guidelines).
129. This type of solution must be implemented by the legislature, not the courts. As
Judge Heaney noted in his footnote to United States v. Meyer, 452 F.3d 998 (8th Cir.
2006), some courts have been far more willing to consider upward departures reasonable
than downward departures. Id. at 1000-01 n.3. It has not been suggested that this is any-
thing other than a discretionary double standard, but even if it could be considered as an
attempt to implement topless guidelines, the judiciary has no authority to perform this
essentially legislative act.
130. The constitutionality of mandatory minimums is secured by Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), but Harris itself may be vulnerable to constitutional chal-
lenge, as it was decided pre-Booker and two members of the Harris majority have since
been replaced. Moreover, Harris relies on reasoning that is arguably inconsistent with the
constitutional opinion in Booker, specifically its focus on the source of the sentence as op-
posed to the impact on the defendant.
131. Excepting, of course, the fact of a prior conviction.
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this type of solution comes from Justice Stevens's dissent in
Booker, where he stated:
Rather than engage in a wholesale rewriting of the SRA, I would
simply allow the Government to continue doing what it has done
since this Court handed down Blakely-prove any fact that is re-
quired to increase a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt."132
This solution, rejected by the Supreme Court but still available to
the legislature, would keep the Guidelines as-is, including their
mandatory nature but prohibit judges from finding facts that in-
crease the Guidelines range. In many ways, this fits best with the
rationale of Apprendi, preventing defendant's sentences from be-
ing raised at all based on facts found by a judge rather than a
jury.
This path is open to some experimentation. The legislature
could abolish the Guidelines altogether and focus on creating
more comprehensive definitions of crimes and more defined statu-
tory ranges. It could make enhancements for distinct crimes,
mandate bifurcated trials, or create a nested series of lesser in-
cluded offenses. Under a jury-finding system, prosecutors would
also play a large role, lobbying defendants to waive their right to
a jury trial and submit to judicial fact-finding as part of plea bar-
gaining. While issues might arise concerning the imbalance of
power between the prosecution and the defense, a freely given
waiver of this kind would certainly meet Sixth Amendment stan-
dards.
While it seems to us that the basic discretionary path option is
the path mandated by Booker, the purpose of this article is not to
set forth our opinions of what sentencing ought to be. Instead, we
offer these options as a starting point for a discussion on how a
constitutional sentencing method can be created now that the old
mandatory Guidelines regime is no longer viable. Variations on
the two major themes presented in this section are sure to
abound,'33 and each should be explored more thoroughly in the
future before post-Booker sentencing reaches its final form.
132. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 284-85 (2005).
133. See, e.g., D'Addio, supra note 119, at 174-75 (stating that appellate courts should
look only to the facts of conviction when determining reasonableness, not judicially deter-
mined facts).
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Currently, a majority of the circuit courts treat the Sixth
Amendment as a constitutional technicality that ruined an oth-
erwise ideal system rather than as a bedrock principle of Ameri-
can law. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court warned against at-
tempts by the legislature to circumvent the constitutional rules it
laid down;... this type of circumvention is precisely what is hap-
pening now, only led by the lower courts rather than Congress.
The warning in Apprendi may provide some indication of the Su-
preme Court's ultimate conclusion in Claiborne and Rita: the Ap-
prendi principles, and by extension the principles of Blakely and
Booker, have been ignored, and now the Court may come down
with a much more expansive vision of sentencing law than we
have previously seen.
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently, the Fourth Circuit and the other circuits, con-
sciously or not, are attempting to revive the mandatory Guide-
lines system by attaching a virtually irrebuttable presumption of
reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences while imposing a
high bar for judges to hurdle should they wish to grant a vari-
ance. Essentially, these appellate courts have written in a few ex-
tra requirements that greatly increase the practical difficulties
with sentencing but do nothing to alleviate the constitutional
problems. Now, the problems of this system seem poised to over-
take it. In Claiborne and Rita, the Supreme Court will either em-
brace the principles expressed in Apprendi or forever relegate
Booker to a constitutional footnote. We believe they will choose
the former.
Courts must recognize that sentencing as it was prior to Booker
is simply no longer a constitutionally viable option. We must find
a new path, one that keeps in mind the dictates of the Sixth
Amendment, the realities of sentencing, and the practical effects
of policy decisions. And while we must be ever mindful of the
dangers coming from Congress, we cannot prevent these dangers
through neglect of our constitutional duties. Instead, we must in-
stitute a system that complies with Apprendi and its progeny and
obeys the mandates of Booker without assuming the legislative
134. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n.16 (2000).
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role. Many paths open before us as we proceed into the uncertain
territory that lies beyond Booker, each with its own benefits and
perils. One thing is clear, however: the road we are currently on
leads tortuously backward, and that is a place we can never go
again.
